Abstract: This article considers the social desirability of prison work programs in a model in which the function of imprisonment is to deter crime. Two types of prison work programs are studied-voluntary ones and mandatory ones. A voluntary work program is socially beneficial: if prisoners are paid a wage that just compensates them for their disutility from work, the deterrent effect of the prison sentence is unaffected, but society obtains the product of the work program. But a mandatory work program is superior to a voluntary work program: if prisoners are forced to work without compensation, the deterrent effect of the prison sentence rises, allowing society to restore deterrence and save resources by reducing the probability of detection or the sentence length, and also to obtain greater output than under the optimal voluntary work program. In an extension of the basic analysis, however, in which prisoners vary in their disutility from work, a voluntary work program may be superior to a mandatory work program because prisoners with relatively high disutility from work can elect not to work.
work programs must take into account both the direct benefits of prison output and the indirect effects on deterrence. 7 I consider two types of prison work programs: voluntary ones in which inmates are offered opportunities to work, which they are free to accept or reject, and are paid a wage; and mandatory ones that require prisoners to work, and that might include some compensation. I first analyze prison work programs in Section 2 in a benchmark model in which individuals are identical except for the potential gain they would obtain from committing a crime. In particular, were they to participate in a prison work program, it is assumed that they would each have the same productivity and would each suffer the same disutility from working.
A voluntary work program is superior to no work program in the benchmark case. To understand why, suppose that the wage in the voluntary program equals the disutility that prisoners would bear from working, and assume that prisoners would choose to work at this wage. A voluntary work program with this wage would leave the disutility of the prison 7 I distinguish between a prison work program and a prison vocational training program. A work program, as I use that term, is for the purpose of producing valuable output within prisons given the present skills of prisoners, whereas a vocational training program is focused on developing prisoners' skills so as to better prepare them for productive work outside of prison after they complete their sentences. In practice, of course, there is not such a rigid distinction since prisoners may learn some useful skills in work programs and may produce some useful output in vocational training programs. But I will not in this paper be concerned with the enhancement of skills by prisoners or with their prospects for employment after serving their sentences (though see comment (d) in Section 4).
sentence-and thus deterrence-unchanged. But taxpayers are better off because they obtain the value of prisoners' output. Hence, a voluntary work program would be socially desirable. 9 However, a mandatory work program can function even better than a voluntary work program. In essence, that is because prisoners are made worse off by being forced to work without pay. This results in an increase in deterrence, everything else equal. The level of welfare of prisoners, and hence deterrence, can be restored either by shortening the prison term or by lowering the probability of detection, either of which would improve the welfare of taxpayers by lowering public costs. Because taxpayers obtain this benefit in addition to the value of prisoners' output, while the level of welfare of prisoners is unaffected, a mandatory work program is superior to a voluntary one.
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In Section 3 I reconsider the merits of prison work programs under two extensions of the benchmark model. I first explain that if prisoners differ in terms of their productivity, the ranking of the policies is not affected. For essentially the same reasons as those discussed above, a mandatory work program is preferable to a voluntary one, which in turn is preferable to no work program.
However, if prisoners differ in terms of their disutility from work, the ranking of the policies might change. Although a voluntary prison work program would continue to be superior to no work program, a mandatory work program no longer is necessarily preferable to a voluntary work program. The potential advantage of a voluntary work program is that it allows 9 I demonstrate that the optimal voluntary prison work program offers prisoners the opportunity to work at the first-best number of hours and pays them the lowest possible wage that induces them to work. 10 I show that the optimal mandatory prison work program requires prisoners to engage in maximal work (exceeding the level of work under the voluntary program) and does not compensate them for this work. prisoners with relatively high disutility from work to opt out of working. Everything else equal, this is socially desirable if their disutility from work exceeds the value of their output.
Section 4 concludes with several comments, including on the role of prison work programs when the purpose of imprisonment is incapacitation or rehabilitation.
Prison Work Programs in the Benchmark Model
In this section I begin by describing the standard model of deterrence through imprisonment, in which prison work programs are absent, and then analyze voluntary and mandatory work programs within this framework.
A. The Benchmark Model
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Risk-neutral individuals contemplate committing a harmful act in order to obtain a benefit that varies among them. If they commit the act, they are caught with a positive probability. They are assumed to have no wealth, so that the only sanction that can be imposed on them is a prison sentence. Sentences are measured in units of time corresponding to one dollar of disutility.
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An individual will commit an offense if his benefit b exceeds the expected disutility of the sentence ps.
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Social welfare equals the benefits that individuals obtain from committing harmful acts, less the harms they cause, less the disutility that they bear from imprisonment, and less the state's cost of imprisoning individuals and maintaining the probability of detection. Hence, social welfare in the absence of a prison work program is
ps The state's problem is to choose the probability of detection p and the sentence s to maximize (1). Let p N * and s N * be the optimal probability and sentence in the benchmark model (subscript "N" for "no" prison work program). For present purposes, it is not necessary to characterize these results.
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B. A Voluntary Prison Work Program
Now consider a voluntary work program in which prisoners choose whether to participate given the wage offered per unit time. If they decide to participate, I assume that they work for a fixed number of hours specified by the state.
Let λ = maximum fraction of time that a prisoner is capable of working per period; λ < 1;
12 Implicit in this construction is that the disutility of a sentence is proportional to its length. My results do not depend on this assumption, but it simplifies the analysis. 13 There is no loss of generality in assuming that an individual will not commit the offense when he is indifferent.
14 It will also be the case that I do not need to derive the optimal probability of detection and sentence under the voluntary and mandatory prison work programs. The disutility from working is in addition to the normal disutility of time in prison, so if a prisoner chooses to work the total disutility from a sentence s is s(1 + d(λ V )). Output is measured in units that correspond to one dollar of value. For notational simplicity, I will in the present section drop the subscript on w (other than in the statements of the propositions).
Additionally, I assume that the maximum value of prison work per period is less than the public cost of imprisonment per period, that is, λn < c.
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It will be useful to define the level of work that maximizes the net social value of work. Let λ* = first-best level of work per period, that is, the λ that maximizes the value of the output of work net of the disutility incurred to produce it, λn -d(λ). I assume that λ* > 0, which implies that n > d′(0), and that λ* < λ. 16 Thus, λ* is an interior solution satisfying d′(λ) = n. Social welfare will reflect not only the factors that were included in the absence of a work program-the benefit from offenses less their harm, the disutility of imprisonment, and the public cost of imprisonment and enforcement-but also the disutility that prisoners bear from working and the value of their output. Accordingly, if w ≥ w, social welfare under a voluntary prison work program is
Note that because the wage w is a transfer payment, it only affects social welfare through its effect on the level of deterrence (the lower bound of the integral). If w < w, no one will work and social welfare will be given by (1).
The state's problem is to choose p, s, λ V , and w to maximize (2), subject to the constraints that λ V ≤ λ and w ≥ w. The optimal values will be designated with an asterisk. (b) In a private labor market, in which workers can choose how much to work, they would need to be paid a wage equal to the marginal value of their output in order to induce them to choose the first-best level of work. But in a voluntary prison labor market, where the level of work is chosen by the state and can be set at the first-best level, prisoners only need to be paid enough to induce them to prefer working to not working. In other words, they only have to be paid enough to compensate them for their average disutility from work. Since their marginal disutility from work is increasing, their average disutility from work is less than their marginal disutility. This implies that, if prisoners are paid the lowest possible wage that induces them to work, they will be receiving less than the marginal value of their work.
(c) The reason that the optimal wage to employ in a voluntary prison labor program is the lowest possible wage that induces prisoners to work should by now be familiar. Any higher wage would reduce deterrence and require costly public expenditures on enforcement or imprisonment to offset this reduction.
Proof: I first establish that, for any voluntary work program λ V > 0 in which prisoners are induced to work, the optimal wage equals w(
The optimal wage cannot be lower than this since prisoners would then choose to not work. Suppose the wage were higher, say ŵ > w(λ V ). Then the wage could be lowered to w(λ V ), which would increase deterrence, and the probability of detection could be lowered to some p • < p so as to return deterrence to its original level: p
. 17 This would have two beneficial effects on social welfare (2). First, the cost of maintaining the probability of detection would decline.
Second, the expected sentence length ps would decline, which would raise social welfare if
; that this inequality holds follows from the assumption that λn < c.
Hence, the optimal wage is w(
Given the preceding result, the level of deterrence, ps(1
, equals ps regardless of λ V . Thus, the optimal λ V can be derived by maximizing the integrand of social
hence, λ V * = λ*.
C. A Mandatory Prison Work Program
Next consider a mandatory work program in which prisoners are told how much they have to work and might be compensated for this work. Let For notational simplicity, I will drop the subscript on w when there is no ambiguity.
Since the expected disutility of the sentence now is ps(1
The state's problem is to choose p, s, λ M , and w to maximize (4), subject to the constraint
Proposition 3 
, so that the levels of deterrence under the voluntary and mandatory work programs will be the same. Social welfare under the mandatory program will exceed that under the voluntary program if
which follows from λn < c (implying that the expression in parentheses is positive) and p M < p.
Moreover, the cost of enforcement will be lower under the mandatory work program, Comments: (a) It is easy to see why it is optimal not to compensate prisoners for their work under a mandatory work program. On one hand, compensating them would improve their welfare in prison and thereby reduce deterrence, which would be socially costly to offset by raising the probability of detection or lengthening the prison sentence. On the other hand, there is no adverse effect on their output as a result of not compensating them since their work is mandatory.
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(b) Parallel intuition explains why the optimal work requirement is maximal. By requiring prisoners to work as much as possible without compensation, the disutility of prison per unit time is maximized. This increases deterrence and allows the probability of detection or the sentence to be reduced, saving enforcement or sanctioning costs. While the resulting decrease in the expected sentence length reduces output, everything else equal, the value of this lost output is more than offset by the corresponding savings in the public cost of imprisonment (given λn < c).
(c) It might be surprising that the optimal work requirement is maximal even if, as I assume, this level of work exceeds the first-best level, λ > λ*. For example, how could it be that it is desirable to require maximal work even if the corresponding level of disutility imposed on a prisoner, d(λ), exceeds the value of the resulting output, λn? The explanation is that when the work requirement is raised, the expected disutility from imprisonment, ps(1 + d(λ)), can be kept constant by lowering the probability of detection p or the sentence length s (or both). With this adjustment, the aggregate welfare of offenders and the aggregate level of harm is unchanged.
But the state gains as a result of a reduction of the expected net cost of imprisonment per offender, ps(c -λn), due to a decline in ps and an increase in λ. The state also will gain through lower enforcement costs if the decline in ps is due in part to a reduction in p.
Proof: I first show that w M * = 0. Suppose otherwise and consider some w M > 0; let p M , s M , and λ M be the optimal probability, sentence, and work requirement under a mandatory work
lowered to 0, deterrence will rise. Lower p M to p M so as to restore deterrence to its original level;
Lowering p M to p M raises social welfare (4) 
This will have two beneficial effects on social welfare (4). First, the expected net social costs of imprisonment decline, that is
To see that (8) holds, rewrite it using (7) and divide through by s M to obtain
The result follows because p M < p M and λ M < λ. Second, lowering p M to p M reduces enforcement costs, k(p). Thus, λ M < λ could not have been optimal. □
Extensions
In this section I consider two generalizations of the benchmark model, first allowing prisoners to vary with respect to their productivity and then with respect to their disutility from imprisonment. In each case I discuss the ranking of the two types of prison work programs and no work program.
A. Prisoners Differ in Productivity
For many types of prison work, there could be significant variations in the productivity of prisoners. Able-bodied younger prisoners may be able to collect more trash along a highway than older prisoners. Some prisoners may be able to concentrate on complicated tasks better than others and consequently make fewer errors in operating prison machinery, such as that used to make license plates.
Let α = productivity coefficient; α ≥ 0; and z(α) = density of α among prisoners; z(α) > 0 for all α ≥ 0.
Thus, the productivity an α-type prisoner is αn. I assume that the mean of α is 1; that the densities of b (the benefit from committing the offense) and α are independent; and that the state only knows the distribution of α among prisoners, not its value for each one.
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Voluntary prison work program: Given the state's information, the same work program and wage rate must be offered to all prisoners. Since a prisoner's decision whether to work only depends on these values and the disutility from work, which does not vary among prisoners in the present case, the behavior of prisoners will be the same as in the benchmark model. All will work if w ≥ w and none will work if w < w.
Assuming w ≥ w, social welfare under a voluntary work program will now be
Mandatory prison work program: Although the optimal wage under a mandatory prison work program was shown to be zero in the benchmark model, I will not preclude here the possibility that the wage is positive. Hence, social welfare under a mandatory prison work program is in the present case
Proposition 5: If prisoners differ in their productivity, then the ranking of the policy alternatives is the same as that in the benchmark model: Proof: The proof of part (a) is essentially identical to the proof of Proposition 1. All that needs to be recognized is that, since the mean of α is 1, (10) is the same as (2). Similarly, the proof of part (b) follows from the proof of Proposition 3 since (11) is the same as (4). □
B. Prisoners Differ in Disutility From Work
The disutility of work also could vary widely among prisoners. Picking up trash along a highway would be more distasteful to individuals with weak backs than to those with normal backs. Working in a noisy machine shop may be more stressful to some prisoners than to others.
To reflect such variations, 20 let τ = disutility coefficient; τ ≥ 0; and r(τ) = density of τ among prisoners; r(τ) > 0 for all τ ≥ 0.
Thus, the disutility from work for a τ-type prisoner is τd(λ). I assume that the mean of τ is 1; that the densities of b and τ are independent; and that the state can only observe the distribution of τ, not its value for a particular prisoner.
Voluntary prison work program:
Since the work program and wage rate offered for work has to be the same for all prisoners, whether they will choose to work will vary among them. A τ-type prisoner will choose to work if
, w V ) = critical disutility coefficient at and below which a prisoner will choose to work and above which would choose not to work,
Social welfare under a voluntary work program will now be
∞ ∞
+ ∫{∫[b -h -ps(1 + c)]v(b)db}r(τ)dτ -k(p). τ ps
The first term reflects the contribution to social welfare by prisoners who choose to work and the second term the contribution by those who decline to work.
Mandatory prison work program:
Under a mandatory work program, variations in the disutility from work will affect the level of deterrence, but not whether a prisoner works.
Again allowing for the possibility of a positive wage, social welfare under a mandatory prison work program is in the present case Comments: (a) The first part of the proposition can be explained as follows. Given a positive wage under a voluntary work program, prisoners with relatively low levels of disutility from work will choose to work. The marginal prisoner will be indifferent between working and not working, and therefore will be deterred to the same extent as he would be if there were no work program. But the inframarginal prisoners, whose levels of disutility from working are lower, will be strictly better off by participating in the work program and therefore will be deterred less. The optimal wage rate balances the social benefit from having more prisoners work, as the wage rate is raised, with the social detriment of more crime. Note, however, that starting from a wage rate of zero, there are no inframarginal prisoners who will be deterred less if the wage rate is raised slightly; the only prisoners who pursue the opportunity to work will be those with negligible disutility from work and who will be indifferent between working and not working. Since there will be no first-order reduction in deterrence, but there will be a first-order enhancement of social welfare due to the productive output of these prisoners, it will always be desirable to employ a positive wage rate. In other words, it will always be better to have a voluntary prison work program than none at all.
(b) With respect to the second part of the proposition, first observe that if the variation among prisoners in the disutility from work is small, then the results tend towards those in the benchmark case in which a mandatory work program is preferable to a voluntary work program.
Hence, the main result that needs to be explained here is why, if there is significant variation among prisoners in the disutility of work, a mandatory work program might be inferior to a voluntary one. In essence, the potential advantage of a voluntary work program is that it allows prisoners with relatively high disutility from work to opt out of working; were they forced to work, their disutility from work could well exceed the value of their output. Put differently, a voluntary work program beneficially harnesses the private information of prisoners about their disutility from work in a way that a mandatory work program cannot.
(c) To illustrate this point more concretely, suppose that there are an equal number of two types of prisoners, those with low disutility from work and those with high disutility from work. Suppose, too, that the value of the output from work is midway between these two levels of disutility and is the same for both groups. Then, if the state requires all prisoners to work-it cannot observe their levels of disutility and distinguish between the two types-the aggregate value of the output from prison work will be just offset by the aggregate disutility associated with that work. There would be no net social gain from prison work. In contrast, if the state were to use a voluntary work program and set the wage at a level that would just induce prisoners with low disutility from work to accept it, then there would be a net social gain from their work since the value of their output would exceed their low level of disutility. prisoner's output might be influenced by his effort, such as how vigilant he is in picking up trash along a highway or how much he concentrates on the tasks required to make a pair of shoes.
When prisoner effort of this sort is unobservable by administrators of prison work programs, there is an argument for paying prisoners for their output even under a mandatory work program, or paying them more than the minimum required to induce them to work under a voluntary work program. The reason, of course, is that this will generate more output. Prisoners paid by the weight of their collected trash or the number of shoes they produce undoubtedly will collect more and produce more. Because these additional payments will tend to reduce deterrence, their desirability will depend on a comparison of the value of the additional output they generate to the public cost of raising the probability of detection or the length of the sentence in order to restore deterrence.
(b) What if prisoners like prison work? I assumed that prisoners bear disutility from working, but this might not always be the case. Although prisoners may dislike picking up trash along a highway on a hot day or having to clean bathrooms, they might obtain some satisfaction from repairing prison uniforms or preparing and serving food in the prison kitchen. If prisoners like some prison work, then the deterrent effect of a mandatory work program would decline to a degree. Similarly, a voluntary work program could result in lower deterrence if prisoners prefer to do some work even without compensation. But for my analysis to be affected in an essential way, it would have to be the case that prisoners like work so much that they would prefer to work without pay for the maximum possible amount of time (say ten hours a day every day of the year) than not to work.
(c) What if the goal of imprisonment is incapacitation?
Suppose that the objective of imprisonment is to incapacitate prisoners -to keep them from committing additional crimesrather than to deter them from committing crimes. 21 The degree to which this objective is satisfied depends solely on the probability of detection and the sentence-specifically, on the expected sentence length ps. Given the probability of detection and the sentence, is a prison work program desirable, and if so, is a mandatory or voluntary program better? For simplicity, I
will answer these questions under the assumptions of the benchmark model in which prisoners are equally productive and bear the same disutility from work. First observe that if deterrence is not a concern, then there is no reason to choose one work program over the other, for each can achieve whatever level of work λ is desired. The mandatory work program can require this level of work, and the voluntary work program can offer a high enough wage to induce prisoners to work this much. Moreover, assuming that the first-best level of work is positive (that is, n > d′(0)), a prison work program will be desirable even when the objective of imprisonment is incapacitation. Of course, imprisonment can serve both of these goals (and others, as I note in the next comment) simultaneously. For clarity, I will discuss each goal as if it were the only one. 22 The following description is based primarily on Seiter (2016, pp. 70 & 406-09 In this Appendix I demonstrate through an example that a voluntary prison work program can be superior to a mandatory one when the disutility of work varies among prisoners. (It also will be the case in this example that a mandatory work program is preferable to no work program.)
The example employs discrete distributions of the benefit from committing the offense and the disutility from work. For simplicity, I assume that it is costless to set the probability of detection and that it is set equal to 1. 
where s is the maximal sentence length. I also assume that prison work is socially beneficial on average (averaged over the d L -types and d H -types), but in a limited way; specifically, let
No prison work program: The level of deterrence is s. If s < b L , no one will be deterred and the level of social welfare will be
Clearly, in this case, the optimal s is 0, in which case social welfare will be
If s  b L , the b L -types will be deterred, but not the b H -types, so the level of social welfare will be
In this case, the optimal s is as low as possible consistent with continuing to deter the b L -types, that is, such that s = b L . Then social welfare is (A6) with s = b L .
I assume that social welfare (A6) with s = b L will exceed (A5), where no one is deterred.
This requires that
which clearly will hold for h sufficiently high. 25 It will be clear that I could modify the example by making the conventional assumption that it is costly to raise the probability, provided that the cost of setting the probability equal to 1 is sufficiently low. 26 Obviously, (A2) could not hold unless
no b H -types are deterred. I consider the optimal choices of s, λ, and w within each of these cases and thereby determine the highest level of social welfare achievable within each case. I then make an assumption regarding the magnitude of h that results in social welfare being highest overall in the third case.
In the first case, s(1
Since λn < c, the terms in parentheses multiplying s are all positive, implying that the optimal s is 0. Hence, maximal social welfare in the first case is (A5).
In the second case,
Since λn < c, the optimal s is the lowest s that still allows deterrence of the b L -types with high
It is clear from this condition that the higher λ is and the lower w is, the lower s can be. Hence, maximal social welfare in the second case is (A9) with λ = λ and s = b L /(1 + λd H ).
In the third case, b L ≤ s(1 + λd L -λw) and social welfare is
By parallel reasoning to that in the second case, maximal social welfare in the third case is (A10)
Now observe that maximal social welfare in the third case under the mandatory work program exceeds that when there is no work program and the b L -types are deterred. In other words, the claim is that (A10) with λ = λ and s = b L /(1 + λd L ) exceeds (A6) with s = b L . After dividing (A10) and (A6) by (1 -φ), this can be expressed as
where
where the equality follows from (A2). That the inequality in (A12) holds follows from observing that s N > s M3 > 0 and  > 0.
The result in the preceding paragraph also implies that, under a mandatory work program, the outcome in the third case is superior to the outcome in the first case. This is because the outcome in the first case is the same as that when there is no work program and no deterrence, which was assumed to be inferior to the outcome when there is no work program and the b Ltypes are deterred.
Thus, under a mandatory work program, it remains to compare the outcomes in the second and third cases. The third-case outcome will be superior if (A10) with λ = λ and s = b L /(1 + λd L ) exceeds (A9) with λ = λ and s = b L /(1 + λd H ). By collecting terms multiplying h, this condition can be expressed as Instead, I will show that under an assumption that is consistent with the assumptions already made, a voluntary work program will generate a higher level of social welfare than the best mandatory work program. 
